一、报告题目
　　Licensing Essential Patents: The Non-Discriminatory Commitment and Hold-Up

　　二、报告人
　　帅杰，中南财经政法大学副教授，于美国University of Oklahoma获得经济学博士学位，长期从事微观经济学、产业组织、博弈论等方向的研究，在《International Journal of Industrial Organization》、《Journal of Economics》等国际知名期刊上发表多篇论文。

　　三、报告时间
　　11月3日下午3：30

　　四、报告地点
　　中心校区知新楼B321

　　五、报告摘要
　　Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory(RAND)terms.Using a model with upstream owners of essential patents and downstream licensees who invest into a standard-conforming technology before the royalty rates are set,this paper demonstrates that the nondiscriminatory(ND)commitment helps alleviate the hold-up problem.Moreover,it promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased.In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the ND commitment, committing is the dominant strategy and all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.

　　六、主办单位
　　山东大学经济学院