一、报告题目
　　Analytical Cooperative Games
　　二、报告人
　　曹志刚，中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院助理研究员，研究领域包括博弈论：讨价还价理论、算法博弈论、网络博弈；组合优化：排序论。
　　三、报告时间
　　2016年11月17日15：30
　　四、报告地点
　　中心校区知新楼B321
　　五、报告摘要
　　We provide a general framework for analyzing resources pooling games. We focus on nice cooperative functions, which derive balanced games for all possible endowments. We show that a cooperative function is nice if and only if a modified Aubin core (a.k.a. a linear core, set of Owen points or shadow prices) of the cooperative function is nonempty at each point. We also characterize concave nice cooperative functions and convex ones and study when a cooperative function always derives a convex game. Applications of this framework include coupon exchange games, linear production games and newsvendor games etc. In particular, compared with the well-known fact that the dual-optimal solution set is in general a proper subset of the core of a linear production game, the Aubin core of a linear production game always equals the dual-optimal solution set. The Aubin core of a nice cooperative function is also closely related to superdifferential,implying that powerful analytical tools are useful in this framework.
　　六、主办单位
　　山东大学经济学院