一、报告题目
　　Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition
　　二、报告人
　　赵昕博士，澳大利亚悉尼科技大学
　　三、报告时间
　　2016年12月29日15:15
　　四、报告地点
　　知新楼B423聚贤报告厅
　　五、报告摘要
　　Abstract: This paper studies how the composition and voting rule of a decision-making committee affect the incentives for its members to acquire information. Fixing the voting rule, a more polarized committee acquires more information. If a committee designer can choose the committee members and voting rule to maximize her payoff from the collective decision, she forms a heterogeneous committee adopting a unanimous rule, in which one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all others are extremely opposed to the decisive voter and serve as information providers. The preference of the decisive voter is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer.
　　六、主办单位
　　山东大学经济学院